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Common ground - a product or a process?
W. Jonas Hochschule für Künste Bremen, Germany

Abstract
What does the Common Ground metaphor mean: solid rock, fertile soil, or swampy lowlands? Are
we mapping the terrain or are we just constructing it because it would be comfortable to have one?
We are in a historical moment, 40 years after the first conference on design methods, initiating the
short “design science decade”, when other disciplines realize the fragile, fluid, historical character
of their “grounds”.
On the lists and in conferences there are fierce debates, yet mainly concerning details of the
respective positions. On the other hand ambitious perspectives are proclaimed, without being rooted
in the community. Contributions reveal little reference to each other. Researchers rarely seem to
take into account positions outside the material that supports their own views. Struggles for
definition power seem to be going on, somewhere between evidence and eloquence. Maybe this is
due to the imperative: “publish or perish”; at least here we have university level.
The paper presents a 4-step sequence of debate in a theory building process. This sample is then
reframed twice, describing it as an evolutionary process and integrating it in a wider perspective of
changing modes of knowledge production. Implications for design are discussed. My further
intention is to initiate a novel form of debate, which might contribute to the communicative creation
of Common Ground. The project “the basic PARADOX” poses the most fundamental question: are
there foundations of design? The new imperative in academic design culture might be: “participate
or perish”.
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Common ground - a product or a process?
… dedicated to the White Knight, defender of Old-European scholarship

Fig. 1: Alice and the Red Queen (Carroll 1996: 151).

Step 1: A new position
In two papers (Jonas 1999, 2000) I formulate my position regarding design foundations. The first
describes design theory as “a floating network of chunks of ideas”, without fixed epistemological
core, acting in the interface region between shifting reference spheres: the contextual and the
artefactual. Some deliberately provocative consequences from this view are, e.g. that there is no
progress in design, or, that design is amoral, and has to be, in order to fulfil its function.
The second paper argues that design is acting in the “swamp”, which is a provisional metaphor for
the hybrid mix of the natural, the human, the social, the divine, which cannot provide foundations
but only entry points to the field. Design has no foundations because design itself is the basic
human activity. Foundations might be emerging patterns in the swamp.
In order to relate design to science I argue that science is also acting in this swamp (in their case
called laboratory), but that science is obliged to purify and de-contextualize the facts constructed
there in order to protect its mythical image of being closer to the truth than other ways of
knowledge creation. And I ask whether design should follow this problematic path.
The following relates this to two other positions. Steps 2 and 3 describe a “struggle” over my view,
leading to a kind of stabilization of essential parts. Step 4 takes up a new idea and tries to develop it
within the context of my framework.

Step 2: Struggle with Ken
Friedman (2001) took a critical look at the papers mentioned. The following is an imaginary
dialogue, i.e. I reply to his critique, concentrating on the questions of overall style and the issues of
progress and foundations.
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K.F.:
“… These papers outline problems and issues without defining them. Opening the problem space
allows us to reflect. Closing the problem space through robust definitions allows us to begin the
search for solutions.”
W.J.:
The basic problems mentioned cannot be defined in a manner you would accept; definitions are not
available. The concept of interface clearly refers to Simon and Alexander and their notions of
design as interface discipline. “Robust” definitions might kill the problem before the search for
solutions has even started. The idea that the problem space has to be closed in order to proceed
towards solutions is inappropriate. Since the early 1970s we could know that in ill-defined, wicked
problem situations problems and solutions evolve in a parallel process. If at all, the problem can be
stated when a solution is achieved. And then the solution is the problem! I am convinced that this is
true for design problems as well as for design theory problems.
K.F.:
“The growth of design knowledge, the steady history of improvements in design practice, the
dramatic development of design research, and the gradual development of design teaching, all
indicate progress.
Progress is not uniform. Comprehensive progress is impossible. Nevertheless, there is relatively
wide agreement in our field that we are meeting Bunge’s (1999: 227) definition of progress as a
‘process of improvement in some regard and to some degree’ in all four areas of design.
The state of physics in 1895 offers a good comparison for our field. Because we are a different kind
of field, we cannot hope to make the fundamental progress that physics has made over the past 100
years. Even so, we can hope to grow if we focus on a progressive research program.
Progress in research and in practice depends on prior art. This is another way of stating that
progress requires foundations. If there is progress – and there is – there must be foundation(s).
There is progress in design. QED: design has foundations.”
W.J.:
I love circular arguments. But the circle cannot be traced back to some explicit axiomatic
“foundation”. The concept of progress you are presenting appears to be rather modest. In my oldfashioned view progress comprises (1) an increase in scientific “truth” (there is progress e.g. in
physics; but in design?), (2) an improvement of the human condition, the claim that Galilei and
Bacon stated for science (there is progress in many fields; but through design?), and, (3) the utopian
claim of enlightenment thinking: better human beings (no progress here). But I do not accuse design
for not showing much progress in this sense, because, as I argued, design is the agency of bridging
the gap, the interface. There is no reference point for defining progress, but merely fit or non-fit. Is
Mac OS X a design progress compared with OS 9, or just an increase in functional complexity?
Parallels with physics or even mathematics seem inappropriate. Maybe there are parallels to the
situation of the Design Methods Movement some 40 years ago: an exponential growth in rigidity …
and then a collapse with important insights: that there are designerly ways of knowing, that design
problems are mostly ill-defined, embedded, situated, etc.
I do not reject systematic inquiry. A culture of inquiry is evolving, which must not necessarily be
the same as, e.g., in the social sciences. Refreshing and inspired designerly ways of inquiry are
possible (Dunne and Raby 2001).
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Step 3: Re-stabilization
Towards the end, after some 12,000 words, there is a considerable shift towards consensus, starting
with the issue of reasoned argument.
K.F.:
“The arguments against the concept of foundations are intuitionist in nature. …
… It is possible to ask for reasoned argument from evidence without locating design in the context
of science.
While I have argued that SOME forms of design practice, design research, and design education
are – and should be – treated as forms of science, this is not the case for all forms of design
practice, research, or education. In contrast, ALL design activity requires reasoned thought. Ideas,
issues, and inspiration often begin with intuition. This is the context of discovery. They must finally
end in reason. This is the context of justification.”
W.J.:
I support the quest for reasoned arguments from evidence. But your article reveals no evidence
regarding design foundations. Evidence cannot be replaced by eloquence. Regarding design, which,
by metaphorical definition, acts at the “wavefront” between the actual and the new, it seems absurd
to come up with the rigid and overcome logical positivist dualism of context of discovery vs.
context of justification. Even in the “hard” experimental sciences there is a continuous multi-level
path of re-construction from the experiment (or observation in situ) to the mathematical formulation
of a “fact” (finished act).
We are still in a metaphorical stage. The design paradigm is trial&error, plus some analytic and
projective tools, called methods, plus some mysterious human capacity called creativity (or
chance?), plus some normative guidelines called style or fashion (or ideology). The same is true for
the evolving artefact of design theory, which is located in the interface region between its evolving
subject matter (design) and its evolving contexts (the reservoir of available theories). The
Darwinian view, the use of basic systemic and evolutionary concepts, might be promising to
transfer swampy metaphors into solid models.
K.F.:
“In the strict sense of Bunge’s definition, it may not be possible to establish an epistemological
foundation for design. …
In arguing for foundations, therefore I do not assert the existence (of) a stable anchor for all design
knowledge. Rather, I point to foundations (in) three senses. One is the historical sense. The next is
the philosophical sense of a basis in goals and purposes. The third involves the multiple senses of
the kinds of knowledge, theory, and practice that different forms of design and design research may
engage.
If it is the case that design is a hybrid field – and the evidence suggests that it is – then design can
occupy several states at any one time, while serving as a forum of different kinds of activities. While
some of these activities must obviously be at variance with one another, variance does not mean
contradiction. There is no reason that design cannot take several shapes, permitting several kinds
of approaches.”
W.J.:
So we are very close to each other. No problem with these types of “foundations”. Main parts of my
argument are stabilized, even the network of “chunks of ideas” seems rehabilitated. There is the
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encouragement to proceed in the outlined direction. What remains is an uncomfortable feeling with
your attitude of “knowing better”.
K.F.:
“In some ways, we clearly disagree. I call for clarity and explicit description. Jonas seems to
believe that metaphor best describes the qualities of (celebrates?) the hybrid swamp. If it were
impossible to describe the wetlands, the science of biology could not exist. The science of
complexity and the concept of complex adaptive systems allow us to describe a hybrid swampy
environment without reducing its richness. This requires greater and more explicit descriptions, not
less.”
W.J.:
Bloedmann! This is exactly what I am arguing for. Nevertheless I acknowledge the shift from
physics to biology.

Step 4: Fresh memes from Dick
In order to develop the theory I will borrow from Buchanan (2001: 67–84). In stating, that “We
tend to dismiss the way human beings have formed their beliefs in response to the natural and
human environment” he explicitly introduces an evolutionary concept. His “ecology of culture”
could well be compared to my “swamp”.
In developing our paths of thinking, we depend upon the philosophical assumptions that stand
behind our basic beliefs, the contingency of which is not made explicit, however. Mostly they rest
in a pre-conscious state of mind. In order to render them more explicit Buchanan identifies or
invents four “generative principles” as generators for the various, sometimes incompatible, patterns
of design theorizing today. His scheme shows two dimensions: the phenomenal processes (A) and
the ontic conditions (B), each with two typical faces, so that a nice cross-scheme is showing up, an
example of theory as design:
A: Phenomenal.
The underlying assumption is “that design is best understood by our experience of it …”
A1: Experience and environment.
The focus lies “on the problems that human beings encounter in their environment. … It seeks to
identify and integrate multiple causes of design rather than reducing it to a single cause. …”. The
four Aristotelian causes are showing up.
A2: Agent.
The focus lies on “the agent who performs an action. Design is shaped by the actions that human
beings take in creating and projecting meaning into the world. …This existential, operational
approach is exemplary in its key features. It looks for successful examples of design practice in the
past or present for models that may guide future ventures in designing. …”
B: Ontic.
The underlying assumption is that there are “‘real and ultimate’conditions that determine design in
human experience …”.
B1: Underlying forces.
The focus lies on “underlying natural forces and material reality. … The paradigm of design is
engineering, since engineering is closest to the natural conditions that are the ´real and ultimate´
conditions of human life. … This … approach … looks to the conditions that have shaped the past
and seeks to project the trends of fundamental forces and movements into the future …”.
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B2: Transcendent ideas.
The focus lies on “ideas and ideals that transcend the necessities and contingencies of physical or
material culture and the limitations of individual, personal experience. … This vision … is always
oriented toward an ideal of beauty, truth, or justice that transcends and permeates the world of
human experience, giving structure to meaning and values. …”.
Thus an explanatory structure for the chaotic image of design theory building is offered. The
scheme as a whole reveals a strong Platonic appearance, which Buchanan only attributes to
principle B2. It seems to float in an eternal realm of ideas, producing the puzzling variety of the
phenomenal world of design theories. But where does it come from? Can it be integrated into the
knowledge production process?
The answer is contained in the scheme itself. Buchanan - between the lines - seems to be in favour
of principle A1: Experience and environment. Humans’ experiences lead to personal attitudes,
preferences, styles. In consequence, theories of how the world (or design) works will come up,
according to those preferences. Buchanan’s four principles are one of these emerging theories,
which, in turn, through their dissemination (Design Issues is an effective replicator) influence
personal attitudes, preferences, and styles in the community, and which shape the further conditions
of our experiences.
To sum up: Generative principle A1 seems to be a bit “more basic” than the rest, because it contains
the other ones plus itself. This shows the fractal character and self-reference of design theory, and,
this is important, allows to integrate the “Buchanan meme” into the wider process of knowledge
generation.

Reframing 1: A Darwinian view – evolutionary discourse
Steps 1-4 can be interpreted as Darwinian mechanism of (1) mutation – (2) selection – (3) restabilization and retention – and so forth: (1) Jonas introduces a new concept, which might be called
a mutation, creative act, intentional provocation, or whatever an observer might prefer. – (2)
Friedman acts as a selective environment, contesting the proposition. – (3) The chunk of ideas
survives in this “struggle for life”, the interaction of the system (Jonas’ ideas) and the context
(Friedman’s critique). The concept is re-stabilized. – (1’) A new appealing chunk of ideas appears
which Jonas tries to integrate into his concept. – (2’) Someone might act as a selective mechanism,
and so forth. In contrast to a genetic process in biology this mechanism is a memetic process. The
“chunks of ideas” that are transferred might be considered as memes or memplexes (Dawkins 1976,
Blackmore 1999).
The basis of our learning processes, which are the epistemological core of design, can be considered
as biological, grounded in the need of organisms to survive in an environment. The aim cannot be
true representation but (re-) construction for the purpose of appropriate (re-) action. According to
Aristotle the recognizability of the world must rely on the fact that there is a kind of similarity
between the “particles” of the world and those in our senses. The history of biological evolution
indeed suggests certain similarities of the way the material world is structured and the way we think
of the world. Evolutionary epistemologists (Campbell 1974) argue that the Kantian transcendental
apriori has to be replaced by the assumption of an evolutionary fit between the objects and the
subject of recognition.
The evolutionary model of knowledge production presents a spiral scheme of learning / innovation
with structural identity from the molecular to the cognitive and cultural level (Riedl 2000). The
basic structure, described in concepts of the uppermost level, is a circle of trial (expectation) and
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experience (success or failure, confirmation or refutation), of action and reflection. Starting with
passed cases, the circle consists of an inductive / heuristic semi-circle with purposeful learning from
experience, leading to hypotheses and theories and prognoses about how the world works, and a
deductive / logical semi-circle with the confirmation or refutation of theories due to new cases, etc.
Only very recently in the cultural evolution this general scheme was subdivided into the
ratiomorphous systems of recognition and the rational systems of explanation / understanding, with
its most extreme form: the logical positivist dualism of “context of discovery” vs. “context of
justification”.
Recognition (Erkennen)
- fitness, “truth” means strong design
- prognosis is projection
- networks, many causes
- simultaneous (simul hoc)
- 4 Aristotelian causes considered
- only local validity, context is crucial
- allows no experiments, mostly irreversible
- correspondence org. or artefact / milieu
- reaches into high complexity
- is labelled “pre-scientific”

Explanation (Erklären / Verstehen)
- “truth” means correct causal relations
- prognosis is forecasting
- linear cause – effect relations
- sequential (propter hoc)
- only causa efficiens considered
- global validity claimed, context excluded
- relies on experiments, mostly reversible
- coherence inside a system
- reduces complexity
- is labelled “scientific”

Table 1: Erkennen vs. Erklären (Riedl 2000: 53 – 55).
While the ratiomorphous process of recognition has a high potential in dealing with complex,
evolving phenomena, it is not very useful for causal explanations, and vice versa. But this
“dilemma” is not inherent in the nature of knowledge production, but rather a consequence of the
dualistic concept, which we have imposed on the process. The path from recognition to explanation
is continuous and circular, sometimes with dead ends. Our language is too poor, or, too much
locked in the “black&white” tradition, to express the beautiful shades of “grey” between the poles.
In design the primary criterion of “truth” might be consensus in a community. The crucial question
is whether design really needs the purified notion of explanation.
We can refer to Cross (2001):
“The underlying axiom of this discipline is that there are forms of knowledge special to the
awareness and ability of a designer, independent of the different professional domains of design
practice.”
Concepts of evolutionary innovation suggest similarities between the way the design process works
and the way we theorize about design. These special “forms of knowledge” are the basic cycle of
innovation and learning as described above. They are unspecific, because they are the formerly
universal competence of humans dealing with their environment.

Reframing 2: Changes in society and knowledge production
Basically humans are “universal dilettantes”. The functional differentiation of societies de-valuated
this trans-competence. Design professionalizes the competence of “universal dilettantism”; the
human poietic drive is compensated by Do-It-Yourself industries. High modernity believed in
planning, predictability, progress, and in the inexorable “scientization of society”. The 3rd quarter
of the 20th century saw the peak of professionalization, the deficits of which have been described
sufficiently (e.g. Schön 1983).
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Since the 1970s we experience severe transformations in society and in the patterns of knowledge
production, characterized, in a positive notion, as “knowledge society” (Bell 1973), or, more
negative, as “risk society” (Beck 1986). Seen from a temporal distance, Nowotny et.al. (2001)
characterize it as a shift from “Mode-1” to “Mode-2 society”. The interfaces between state, markets,
culture are increasingly blurred. The relatively autonomous spaces these systems occupied, were
products of the modern differentiation, as was science. The scheme of functional differentiation is
dissolving in parts. The new program of the French CNRS reveals this shift from traditional
disciplines to interdisciplinary problem fields. Moreover, the CNRS introduces the institution of
“citizens’ conferences” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 26.03.2002). In Mode-2 society a new
relation of society and science is showing up which might be labelled the “socialization of science”,
or, the shift from Mode-1 to Mode-2 knowledge production. Science and society become
transgressive, i.e. not only that science can speak to society (it always could), but rather that society
speaks back to science. Innovation is the centrepiece of a new contract between science and society.
It is mainly because of its success, that science has come under more pressure to deliver effective
solutions to a wide range of increasingly complex problems. Thus science is being drawn into the
production of contextualized knowledge.
Contextualization happens
- through the shift from a “segregation” to an “integration” model (discipline focus  problem
focus, or, science  research),
- through the increase in uncertainty and more variation and selective retention through “success”
that accompanies it (a Darwinian mechanism),
- through greater awareness of the place of “people” in our knowledge (actively involved in the
production, conceptualised as either objects of research and / or as addressees of ensuing policies),
Mode-2 knowledge production implies that
the separation of basic and applied research is blurred (e.g. quantum computers),
the separation of natural and artificial, of science (what is) and design (what could be)
becomes fuzzy (e.g. genetic design),
the distinction of facts and values becomes a problem,
the context of application is extended towards a context of implication,
the focus changes from reliable to socially robust knowledge,
the concept of “context of discovery” vs. “context of justification” becomes obsolete,
The “hard” epistemic core of autonomous self-referential science, which scientists have struggled to
articulate and to defend, is weakening. The core is not empty but crowded and heterogeneous,
which is not some sudden paradigm-shift from science to non-science, or from universal standards
of objectivity to locally determined relativism, but the latest stage in a process of adjustment to an
increasingly complex reality. Maybe the situation can be characterized as an uncoupling of
modernization from modernity. The processes of innovation are separated from the values on which
they were once assumed to rely. We have another paradox here: on the one hand, apparently, an
alarming decline in science´s ability and authority to define and explain the natural world; on the
other hand an unprecedented increase in its power to manipulate that world.
A “third way”, a more nuanced and sociologically sensitive epistemology is needed which
incorporates the “soft” individual, social and cultural visions as well as the “hard” body of its
knowledge. Science moves into the agora (Nowotny et. al. 2001: 201):
“... Science is no longer outside, either as a cognitive or quasi-religious authority or as an
autonomous entity with its special access to the reality of nature. ...”.
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Conclusion: Design as a non-modern discipline - science approaches design
Design, as a product of modernity, comes into being as a mediating interface between the making
and the use of artefacts. Functional differentiation of societies is the paradox foundation of design;
paradox, because, at the same time, design, as a cheeky “un-discipline”, rejects this separation,
permanently meddling in everything. In this sense it is orthogonal to the traditional strategies of
modernisation. Recently I formulated three theses regarding design (Jonas 2001), which can be
related to science and the concepts of Mode-2 society and Mode-2 knowledge production.
(1) Design must fit.
This refers to the interface concept of design. The growing contextualization of scientific practice
shifts the emphasis from internal coherence of its findings towards fitness with respect to its
contexts.
(2) Design never ends.
This refers to design as a projective discipline, trying to transfer existing situations into preferred
ones. Once the problem is solved, the solution becomes the nucleus of a new problem. The new
scientific criterion of social robustness requires permanent feedback with its context in the agora.
Scientific problems are never solved (Carroll 1996: 151, 152):
“…‘Now! Now’ cried the Queen. ‘Faster! Faster!’ And they went so fast that at last they seemed to
skim through the air, hardly touching the ground with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice was
getting quite exhausted, they stopped, and she found herself sitting on the ground, breathless and
giddy.
The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly, ‘You may rest a little, now.’
Alice looked round her in great surprise. ‘Why, I do believe we´ve been under this tree the whole
time! Everything´s just as it was!’
‘Of course it is’, said the Queen. ‘What would you have it?’
‘Well, in our country’, said Alice, still panting a little, ‘you’d generally get somewhere else – if you
ran very fast for a long time as we’ve been doing.’
‘A slow sort of country!’ said the Queen. ‘Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to
keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as
that! …”
(3) Design is a special art.
Design does not have to be ashamed of its pre-rational relicts. There are mysterious aspects in
designing, whatever we name them: intuition, creativity, or insights. Heisenberg, comparing mental
images with their final mathematical models, suggests a complementary view of knowledge
production, even in the “very hard” sciences (Miller 1996: 319, 320):
"... And, of course, then you try to give this picture some definite form in words or in mathematical
formula. Then what frequently happens later on is that the mathematical formulation of the
‘picture’ or the formulation of the ‘picture’ in words, turns out to be rather wrong. Still the
experimental guesses are rather right, that is, the actual ‘picture’ which you had in mind was much
better than the rationalization which you tried to put down in the publication. That is, of course, a
quite normal situation, because the rationalization, as everyone knows, is always a later stage and
not the first stage. ..."
Mode-2 science cannot be reduced to its weakening core of formal standards, but has to be
recognized in its widening context. Scientific research practice is approaching designerly ways of
acting and reasoning. Design has never been strictly modern in a Mode-1 sense, and the discipline
should not struggle for modernity in a situation when science and society and other “Sciences of the
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Artificial” (BJM 2001) are leaving important aspects of modernity behind. Design can be
conceptualised as an agency of modernization (innovation), uncoupled from the ideals of
modernity, situated between the established scientific and professional spaces and expert
disciplines.
Wiener (1948) argued that the promising fields for the flourishing of science are those, which have
been neglected between the accepted disciplines. Cybernetics was a product of concrete design
problems. Further disciplines may emerge from those fertile nowhere-lands. But design itself will
remain in the swamp, or, more precisely, design will remain the swamp, where the potential paths
of meaning can grow; or the not-yet-wired brain, where the axons search their connections:
hypothetical, explorative, speculative …
Schön’s (1983) epistemology of reflective practice should be transferred to the process of building
theory / foundations in design. Common Ground is an evolving processual concept, not a system of
standards.

Appendix: the agora http://www.thebasicparadox.de
The basic PARADOX is a web-based project with around 30 participants who submitted texts on
design foundations. It is based on the hypothesis that theoretical approaches in design are rooted in
personal preferences, biographies, academic backgrounds, etc. and are evolving in communicative
processes of negotiating positions. It is my intention to make these networks more transparent, i.e.
to make them visible in one exemplary process: “Hetero-assessment” is requested in the form of
short comments on selected (or all) other texts. “Auto-assessment” is requested as an indication of
the own academic perspective, placement, working style. The outcome will be a kind of “crossimpact” - matrix of positions which (if well done by the participants) might serve as a database for
further analysis as to theoretical clusters, mainstreams, fringe positions, etc. Results will be fed
back into further reflection. Or, as Buchanan puts it (2001: 74):
“Indeed, our ability to reconstruct design in the future may depend for its creativity on an
understanding of the fertile matrix of contrasting ideas and experiences that constitute the ecology
of culture in the moving present.”
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